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Softfail vs fail (~all vs -all)

~all and -all decide the SPF result for every server your record doesn't list. ~all gives softfail, a weak statement that the server is probably not authorized, and receivers shouldn't reject on that alone. -all gives fail, an explicit statement that it isn't authorized, and some receivers reject that mail outright. Neither ending changes whether DMARC passes: DMARC needs an aligned SPF pass or aligned DKIM, and both softfail and fail are simply "not a pass." For domains that send mail we recommend ~all; for domains that send none, v=spf1 -all.

SPF softfail vs hardfail at a glance

People usually say "hardfail" for what the SPF result names fail.

~all (softfail) -all (fail, "hardfail")
What it says Unlisted servers are probably not authorized Unlisted servers are not authorized
What it asks of receivers Receivers shouldn't reject the message based solely on this result, but they may look at it more closely than usual What happens to fail messages is the receiver's policy; if rejecting, the usual SMTP code is 550
Enhanced status code if rejected n/a 5.7.23, SPF validation failed
Counts as an SPF pass for DMARC? No No
Our recommendation Default for domains that send mail Domains that send no mail (v=spf1 -all)

Two other endings for completeness:

  • ?all gives neutral, which receivers must treat exactly like having no SPF record. Leaving all off entirely has the same effect. A question mark doesn't authenticate outgoing messages, and it's sometimes used only for testing.
  • +all, or a bare all, authorizes every server on the internet. Never use it (Common SPF mistakes).

What SPF softfail means

A softfail in your headers (spf=softfail) means the connecting server wasn't authorized by the record for the MAIL FROM domain, and that domain chose the weaker ~all ending. It's a hint, not a verdict. If you see it on your own mail, the usual cause is a sending service that isn't in your record yet (Common SPF mistakes).

An SPF fail (spf=fail) means the same thing with the stronger -all statement attached. It's an explicit statement that the client is not authorized to use the domain.

Either way, the qualifier is a statement about authorization. The record doesn't tell anyone what to do with the message. That's the receiver's policy.

What receivers tend to do

Here's how major providers tend to treat the two endings:

  • Gmail and Google Workspace: with ~all, receivers typically accept messages from senders that aren't in your SPF record, but mark them as suspicious. With -all, they may reject them. Google recommends ~all, and a hyphen can be overly restrictive and cause delivery issues for legitimate email. Rejected mail also can't be used to troubleshoot; DMARC reports are the better place to look.
  • Gmail can block on hard fail. One of its 550 5.7.26 messages says the MAIL FROM domain has an SPF record with a hard fail policy (-all) but the sending IP failed the SPF check, so the message has been blocked.
  • Microsoft 365: for Microsoft 365 domains, Microsoft recommends -all (hard fail) because it also recommends DKIM and DMARC for the domain. That's platform guidance for Microsoft 365.
  • Across receivers generally: most treat ~all and -all similarly, although some are more likely to reject unauthenticated email when -all is used.

How this interacts with DMARC

DMARC looks for an SPF pass on a domain aligned with the From address. Softfail, fail, neutral, and permerror are all the same to DMARC: not a pass. So:

There is one way -all can hurt you. Some receivers run SPF early in the SMTP conversation, before DMARC. An SPF hard fail (-all) can cause a message to be rejected early in the SMTP transaction, before any DMARC processing takes place. Mail that might otherwise pass DMARC because of aligned DKIM could be rejected solely due to an SPF fail. And those messages will never appear in aggregate DMARC reports.

The classic case is forwarding. A forwarder resends your message from its own IP, which your record doesn't list. With -all, a strict receiver can reject it on SPF alone, even though your DKIM signature would have passed DMARC (Email forwarding, SRS, and ARC, Forwarded mail fails DMARC). You won't see it in your reports either.

-all also doesn't stop spoofing of your visible From address. SPF only covers the MAIL FROM domain. Protecting the From address people see is DMARC's job, at enforcement (A safe rollout: p=none to quarantine to reject).

Softfail vs fail isn't quarantine vs reject

They sound alike, and they get mixed up. ~all and -all are SPF results for unlisted servers. p=quarantine and p=reject are DMARC policies for mail that fails DMARC. You can pair ~all with p=reject: your DMARC record still asks receivers to reject mail that has no aligned pass. (A DMARC policy is a request; the receiver makes the final call.) How receivers handle each DMARC policy is in What happens to failing mail under each policy.

How to choose

Our recommendation:

  • Domains that send mail: end with ~all. It keeps the risk lower for legitimate mail from a sender you haven't added yet, and for forwarded mail at receivers that reject on SPF before DMARC runs. Your protection against spoofing of the From address comes from DMARC, not from the SPF ending.
  • Domains that send no mail: v=spf1 -all. There's no legitimate mail to lose.
  • Always exactly one all, at the end. Never +all.

-all still has a real meaning. Receivers can only make a definitive negative determination when the record ends in -all. Some organizations move to it once every sender is in the record and DKIM is aligned everywhere, and Microsoft recommends it for Microsoft 365 domains. If you go that way, do it knowing the early-rejection caution above, and check your aggregate reports first (A field-by-field walk-through of a DMARC aggregate report).

Mistakes worth avoiding

  • Switching to -all before every sender is listed and DKIM-aligned. Strict receivers can then reject mail you never see in reports.
  • Two all terms after merging records. Everything after the first is ignored.
  • ?all in production. It gives no useful signal.
  • Believing a vendor's -all makes your record strict. An include only uses the other record's pass; its -all doesn't end your evaluation (SPF mechanisms: include, a, mx, ip4, ip6, redirect).
  • +all or a bare all (Common SPF mistakes).

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FAQ

Which is better, ~all or -all?

Both are valid SPF. We recommend ~all for domains that send mail, because -all can get forwarded or not-yet-listed mail rejected at strict receivers, sometimes before DMARC runs. Use v=spf1 -all on domains that send no mail.

Do I need -all for DMARC?

No. DMARC needs an aligned SPF pass or aligned DKIM. The all ending only affects servers you didn't list.

Does -all stop people spoofing my From address?

Not by itself. That's DMARC at enforcement.

What does softfail mean in my email headers?

The sending server wasn't authorized by the MAIL FROM domain's record, and that domain uses ~all. Check whether a sending service is missing from the record.

Are softfail and fail the same as quarantine and reject?

No. Softfail and fail are SPF results. Quarantine and reject are DMARC policies.