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Email forwarding, SRS, and ARC

Forwarding usually breaks SPF, because the forwarder's server isn't in your SPF record. DKIM usually survives plain forwarding and fails only when something changes the signed content, which mailing lists and some security gateways do. SRS and ARC are fixes that forwarders and receivers deploy, not you. SRS makes SPF pass again at the next hop, but for the forwarder's domain, so it doesn't make DMARC pass for yours. ARC can carry your original results through a forward, but only to receivers that choose to trust it. What you control as the domain owner is aligned DKIM on all your mail.

What breaks when mail is forwarded

When a message is forwarded, a different server delivers it to the final mailbox. A typical case is a bank writing to an alumni address that relays to a real mailbox. On delivery, that mail will most likely fail SPF checks unless the envelope sender is rewritten by the relaying server, while DKIM signatures will generally remain valid in these relay situations.

Path SPF Your DKIM DMARC for your domain
Plain alias or auto-forward, envelope kept Usually fails: the forwarder's IP isn't authorized Usually passes if content and signed headers are untouched Usually passes, carried by aligned DKIM
Forward with the envelope rewritten (SRS or similar) Passes, but for the forwarder's domain, which isn't aligned Same as above Usually passes only through aligned DKIM
Mailing list that adds a subject tag or footer Fails or isn't aligned Often fails, because signed content changed Often fails, unless the list rewrites the From address
Security gateway that rewrites links or adds banners Depends on routing Can fail A receiver may use ARC if it trusts the gateway

Why lists and gateways break DKIM, and what list software does about it, is covered in DKIM and mailing lists or forwarders. If you're looking at a forwarded message that already failed, start with Forwarded mail fails DMARC.

SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme)

SRS is something the forwarder does. It rewrites the envelope sender (MAIL FROM) into the forwarder's own domain, encoding the original address so bounces can still find their way back. In the original design, a forwarded message from user@source.example through forwarder.example gets an envelope sender like this:

SRS0=HHH=TT=source.example=user@forwarder.example

HHH is a hash and TT a timestamp. Now the next hop checks SPF for forwarder.example, the forwarder's own record authorizes its servers, and SPF passes.

A few things to know about it:

  • It isn't a formal standard. Forwarders can rewrite the MAIL FROM to be in their own domain, and various schemes exist to do this. Implementations differ, so don't expect every forwarder's rewritten address to look the same.
  • It doesn't change the visible From, and it doesn't make DMARC pass for your domain. So directly: "SRS rewriting doesn't resolve the issue of forwarded messages not passing DMARC checks." Its fix is the same as ours: the message has to be "DKIM-signed using the domain in the From address" and the signature has to stay intact until delivery.
  • Google tells forwarding admins to do the same thing without naming SRS: "Change the envelope sender to reference your forwarding domain." It also says "Gmail doesn't automatically authenticate forwarded messages that previously passed authentication. Gmail does its own authentication check on forwarded messages".

SRS in Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 applies SRS when it forwards or redirects mail: mailbox forwarding, inbox rules, mail flow rules, groups with external members, and similar. "As of August 2023," mailbox forwarding uses SRS too. There are exceptions worth knowing if you run Exchange Online:

  • Messages that qualify for the relay pool "skip SRS rewriting and are sent from IP addresses that aren't part of the Microsoft 365 SPF record."
  • SRS doesn't rewrite forwarded messages sent to on-premises servers, unless an admin enables it on the outbound connector.

So don't assume every forward out of Microsoft 365 has been rewritten.

ARC email authentication

ARC (Authenticated Received Chain) is an experimental specification from July 2019. Each intermediary that supports it adds three headers as the message passes through:

  • ARC-Authentication-Results: the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results it saw when the message arrived.
  • ARC-Message-Signature: a signature over the message as it left.
  • ARC-Seal: a seal over the chain so far, with a chain status of cv=none, pass, or fail.

A later receiver can then see that your message passed authentication before a list or gateway changed it, even though SPF and DKIM now fail. A chain can hold up to 50 of these sets.

The receiver decides

ARC doesn't make anything pass on its own. As a matter of local policy, a DMARC processor may choose to accept the authentication assessments provided by an Authenticated Received Chain. The receiver has to trust the sealer. You can't make a receiver trust a forwarder's seal, and there's no ARC tag in your DMARC record.

Adoption is limited. ARC is the prominent example of attempts to make mailing lists work without rewriting From, and none of those methods have become widely used.

What the big providers say:

  • Microsoft 365 lets admins add trusted ARC sealers for services that modify inbound mail before it reaches the tenant. To "Add only legitimate, required services," and that the sealer is "the vendor's signing domain that appears in the d= field of the ARC-Seal header," not your own domain. ARC "overrides DMARC authentication failures only." It doesn't bypass spam filtering, bulk filtering, anti-spam policy actions, mail flow rules, or allow and block lists.
  • Yahoo tells forwarders: "If you forward emails, implement ARC (Authenticated Received Chain)".
  • Google's current forwarding guide and sender guidelines don't mention ARC.

What shows up in your reports

When a receiver accepts mail that failed DMARC because it recognized a forward, it can say so in the aggregate report. The policy override reasons include local_policy, mailing_list, other, policy_test_mode, and trusted_forwarder. For ARC, local_policy is the usual reason, with ARC details in the comment. The field is explained in A field-by-field walk-through of a DMARC aggregate report.

SRS and ARC side by side

SRS ARC
Fixes SPF at the next hop, and bounce routing Carries earlier authentication results across changes
Deployed by The forwarder Intermediaries add it; receivers decide whether to trust it
Makes DMARC pass for your domain? No Not by itself; a receiver that trusts the sealer may accept the earlier results
Standard Not a formal standard Experimental

They solve different breaks and can be used together.

What you control as the domain owner

  • Aligned DKIM on all your mail. It's what survives most forwarding. At p=reject it's required: such domains must not rely solely on SPF to secure a DMARC pass and must apply valid DKIM signatures. How SPF and DKIM compare for vendors is in SPF include vs DKIM from the vendor.
  • Signing that survives. Senders can maximize survivability by limiting the header fields they sign and using relaxed canonicalization, and should avoid the l= length tag. The details are in DKIM and mailing lists or forwarders and Why DKIM signatures fail.
  • Knowing who forwards your mail. Reports will show forwarders' IPs with SPF failing and DKIM passing. That's expected, not spoofing (Legitimate mail vs spoofing in reports).
  • Care with p=reject if your users post to mailing lists. Domains that host users who might post messages to mailing lists should not publish p=reject. Domains wishing to do so should first run p=none for at least a month, then p=quarantine for an equally long period. We treat reject as a careful decision for each domain (When you are ready for p=reject). What receivers do with failing mail under each policy is in What happens to failing mail under each policy.

If you operate forwarding yourself, through a help desk, an alias service, or a gateway, the advice flips: rewrite the envelope (SRS or an equivalent), avoid changing message content, and ARC-seal if your platform supports it.

Mistakes worth avoiding

  • Treating forwarder IPs in reports as attackers and "fixing" them with SPF includes. You can't authorize every forwarder your recipients use, and trying to over-authorizes your domain.
  • Adding your own domain as a trusted ARC sealer in Microsoft 365. The sealer is the intermediary's d=.
  • Expecting ARC to rescue mail that spam filtering junked.
  • Assuming all Microsoft 365 forwarding uses SRS. Relay-pool and on-premises paths differ.
  • Treating inbound email routing or alias services as senders. They forward mail; they don't originate it.
  • Using forwarders as a reason to stay at p=none. Fix DKIM instead. The caution is about p=reject and users who post to lists, not about enforcement as a whole.

Free DMARC account

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FAQ

Does forwarding break DKIM?

Usually not, unless the forwarder or a list changes the message. It usually breaks SPF.

What's the difference between SRS and ARC?

SRS rewrites the envelope so SPF passes at the next hop, for the forwarder's domain. ARC records the earlier authentication results so a receiver that trusts the sealer can use them.

Can I turn on ARC for my domain to fix forwarding?

No. ARC is added by intermediaries and honored, or not, by receivers. Your part is aligned DKIM.

Should I add a trusted ARC sealer in Microsoft 365?

Only for a legitimate service that modifies inbound mail on its way into your tenant, such as a security gateway, using that service's d= value from the ARC-Seal header.

Why do my reports show my mail failing SPF from IPs I don't recognize?

Often they're forwarders. If DKIM passes and aligns, DMARC passes. See Legitimate mail vs spoofing in reports and Forwarded mail fails DMARC.