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DKIM and mailing lists or forwarders

Plain forwarding usually doesn't break DKIM. A forwarder or alias that passes the message on unchanged leaves the signature valid, though it usually breaks SPF, because the mail now comes from the forwarder's server. Mailing lists are different. A list that tags the Subject, adds a footer, or rewrites parts of the message changes signed content, so the original DKIM signature fails. When both SPF and DKIM break, your domain can fail DMARC on mail that's perfectly legitimate, and the sender can't fully fix that alone.

Two kinds of intermediary

It helps to split them, because they behave very differently.

Plain forwarders and aliases

Think .forward files, alumni addresses, or role addresses like finance@association.example that pass mail on to a real mailbox. They re-send without modification, except for the addition of a Received header field and a change of envelope recipient, so the receiver is able to validate the message signature.

The same situation applies under DMARC: the forwarded mail will most likely fail SPF checks unless the envelope sender is rewritten, while DKIM signatures will generally remain valid in these relay situations. For forwarded messages, DKIM authentication is especially important.

Mailing lists and other intermediaries that edit messages

A resending list typically changes things DKIM signed. The usual edits are Subject tags such as [members], replaced Reply-To or Sender headers, appended footers, and altered or stripped MIME parts. An edit invalidates the author's signature if it changes content the signature covers, beyond the changes canonicalization ignores. A list subscriber cannot expect signatures applied before the message was processed by the list to be valid on delivery.

Some forwarders edit too. Google lists actions that can make forwarded mail fail DKIM, including "Modifying the MIME boundaries," "Modifying the message Subject," re-encoding the body, and modifying signed headers such as To, Cc, Date, and Message-ID. Modification "can and likely will" make SPF, DKIM, and then DMARC fail.

So when you see "body hash did not verify" on mail that went through a list, the list's edits are the likely reason (Why DKIM signatures fail).

What happens to DMARC

DMARC passes when SPF or DKIM passes for a domain aligned with your From address (Identifier alignment for SPF and DKIM). These are representative outcomes for mail that passed both aligned checks when sent:

Path SPF Your DKIM DMARC for your domain
Direct delivery Pass (if set up) Pass Pass
Plain forwarder Usually fails Usually still passes Usually passes, carried by aligned DKIM
List that edits the message, From unchanged Fails Fails Fails; receivers weigh your policy as a request
List that rewrites From to its own domain Not about your domain any more Not about your domain any more Evaluated for the list's domain, not yours

That's why aligned DKIM matters so much. It's what carries forwarded mail through DMARC once SPF has broken (What is DKIM and how it works). The symptom-first version of this problem is in Forwarded mail fails DMARC.

What mailing lists do in practice

Common list software works around the problem by changing the From address to make the From header DMARC aligned: some use the list's own address, others rewrite the author's address, for example bob@example.com becomes bob=example.com@user.somelist.example. Those messages then authenticate as the list's domain.

DKIM-aware lists should affix their own signatures after preparing the message. A list's own DKIM pass (d=list.example) authenticates the list. It isn't a pass for your domain.

Not every list behaves this way, so don't assume. Your DMARC aggregate reports will show which list and forwarder sources are sending as your domain and how they fare (A field-by-field walk-through of a DMARC aggregate report).

Where ARC fits

ARC email authentication (Authenticated Received Chain) lets an intermediary attach a sealed record of the authentication results it saw, which a later receiver may consider. It's experimental: intermediaries provide the history and receivers decide whether to trust it. Yahoo tells forwarders to implement ARC; Microsoft 365 lets receiving admins configure trusted sealers, but only legitimate, required services should be added. These list-friendly methods, including ARC, haven't become widely used. ARC isn't something you enable for your direct mail, doesn't turn a failed DMARC result into a pass, and isn't a guarantee of acceptance. ARC and SRS are covered in Email forwarding, SRS, and ARC.

What about SRS?

Forwarders that rewrite the envelope sender help SPF at the next hop. Google asks forwarders to "change the envelope sender to reference your forwarding domain." That does nothing for DKIM. See Email forwarding, SRS, and ARC and, for SPF itself, What is SPF and how it works.

What senders can do

  • Sign every message with an aligned d= domain. That's what gets plain forwards through DMARC.
  • Don't use l= as a list fix. Messages using the length tag are vulnerable to abuse.
  • Consider separate subdomains for tightly controlled mail streams versus person-to-person mail that may go through lists.
  • Read your reports before tightening policy. List and forwarder sources show up in aggregate reports. Investigate before classifying them as spoofing.

What intermediaries can do

  • Avoid changing content that DKIM signed. Avoid changing the body and message headers protected by DKIM.
  • If they must change it, sign again with their own domain after the change.
  • Optionally add ARC seals.

Mailing lists and p=reject

This is where list behavior meets policy. p=reject can be incompatible with, and cause interoperability problems for, indirect message flows such as alumni forwarders, role-based email aliases, and mailing lists. It goes further:

  • Domains that publish p=reject "MUST NOT rely solely on SPF" and "MUST apply valid DKIM signatures."
  • Domains whose users might post to mailing lists should not publish p=reject. If they do, run p=none for at least a month, then p=quarantine for as long again, compare the results, and either ask users not to post to lists or warn them that list participation may be hindered.
  • Receivers must not reject incoming messages solely on the basis of a p=reject policy, but in practice few receivers apply any mitigation, and list mail with an unmodified From is frequently rejected.

So treat p=reject as a careful decision for each domain, not a default. A domain that only sends from platforms you control is a different case from a domain your staff use for everyday mail. For the readiness checks, see When you are ready for p=reject, and for the overall sequence, The right order: SPF, DKIM, DMARC, then BIMI.

Mistakes worth avoiding

  • Saying "forwarding always breaks DKIM." Plain forwarding usually preserves it.
  • Reading every list failure in your report as spoofing. Legitimate indirect mail can fail too.
  • Treating the list's DKIM pass as yours.
  • Trusting every forwarder as an ARC sealer in Microsoft 365.
  • Jumping to p=reject on a domain whose staff post to external lists without checking reports first.

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FAQ

Does email forwarding break DKIM?

Usually not, if the forwarder doesn't change the message. It usually breaks SPF. Lists and gateways that edit content do break DKIM.

Why do list messages fail DMARC for my domain?

The list changed signed content, and the list's server isn't in your SPF record. Many lists now rewrite the From address to their own domain to avoid this.

Will ARC fix it?

Maybe, at receivers that trust the intermediary's ARC seal. It's Experimental and not widely used, so don't rely on it.

Can I sign so footers don't break DKIM?

Not safely. The l= tag is discouraged for exactly this reason.